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Introduction
Nine in every 10 Pacific islanders live in the 
independent countries of the region — Fiji, Kiribati, 
Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The remaining 
tenth — almost a million people in all — live in the 
territories and freely associated states, where formal 
connections with a metropolitan state offer access 
to its resources and opportunities. In different ways, 
and with different levels of devolution of power 
to local governments, eight of the Pacific island 
entities in the Pacific community are territories 
of external states, and a further five Pacific island 
entities are freely associated with an external state. 
Since the 1980s, we have known that the 
benefits of decolonisation in small island states 
are more cultural than economic, and that in the 
Pacific Islands, independent countries have poorer 
development outcomes than those that remain 
territories or continue to have a constitutional 
link to a metropolitan state (Poirine 1998; 
Armstrong and Read 2000; Bertram 2004.) As 
Territory External State
American Samoa USA
Commonwealth of the  
Northern Mariana Islands
USA
Guam USA
New Caledonia France
French Polynesia France
Territory of the Wallis  
and Futuna Islands
France
Tokelau New Zealand
Pitcairn Island United Kingdom
Table 1: Pacific Islands Territories 
Table 2: Pacific Islands Freely Associated  
   Entities 
Entity External State
Federated States of Micronesia USA
Republic of the Marshall Islands USA
Republic of Palau USA
Cook Islands New Zealand
Niue New Zealand
Geoff Bertram points out, a large body of evidence 
now supports the view that there is ‘a negative 
association between sovereign independence and 
present-day per-capita income, indicating that 
while decolonization may have brought political 
and psychological gains, it retarded rather than 
advanced the material prosperity of the decolonized 
populations. The reasons are straightforward: 
small island jurisdictions which are sub-national 
(that is, retain constitutional links to metropolitan 
powers) get more financial assistance per head, 
better access for migrant labour, and a wide range 
of jurisdiction-related opportunities to capitalize on 
non-sovereign status’ (Bertram 2007, 239–40).
In a study that compared 16 dependent with 
19 independent island entities in the Caribbean 
and the Pacific across 25 socioeconomic and 
demographic indicators, Jerome L. McElroy and 
Katherine Sanborn showed that the dependent 
entities had much stronger economic performance, 
with much lower unemployment, higher life 
expectancy, lower infant mortality and ‘greater 
progress along the demographic transition from 
high to low birth and death rates 
that all modernizing societies pass 
through’. They concluded that the 
‘economic linkages afforded by 
dependent status are significant. 
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They include: preferential trade, migration and 
citizenship arrangements, access to metropolitan 
capital markets and specialized labour expertise, 
the subsidized provision of key transport and 
communications infrastructure essential for the 
success of the two primary engines of insular eco-
nomic growth—tourism and offshore finance …’ 
(McElroy and Sanborn 2005, 9–10).
This paper revisits this discussion. It confirms 
that the disparities between living standards in 
dependent and independent Pacific countries 
remain as large as ever — indeed that they are 
probably growing. It examines the situation not 
only of the territories but also of the freely associ-
ated states, whose political status lies somewhere 
between dependence and sovereign independ-
ence. In particular, the paper asks: what can the 
independent Pacific learn from the dependent and 
freely associated Pacific? How might the favourable 
economic circumstances that accompany all cases 
of dependency and some cases of free association 
be reproduced elsewhere in the region? What are 
the policy implications for the Australian Gover-
ment’s Pacific policy? 
Origins of Political Status
The territories
France acquired New Caledonia (pop. 265,639 
in 2012) and French Polynesia (pop. 274,217 
in 2012) as colonies in the nineteenth century. 
France declared protectorates over Wallis and 
Futuna Islands (pop. 13,445 in 2008) in the 1880s, 
annexed them in 1913 and has administered them 
as a French territory ever since. And although 
changes in New Caledonia and French Polynesia 
since the 1990s have created a significant degree of 
self-government, especially in New Caledonia, the 
relationship with France remains territorial in char-
acter. Five French overseas entities — Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, French Guyana, La Réunion, and May-
otte — are ‘départements’ governed as if they were 
parts of mainland France, which is divided admin-
istratively into 96 départements. The remainder, 
including those in the Pacific, are all French over-
seas territories of one kind or another, with dif-
fering degrees of devolution to local governments. 
All permanent residents of French Polynesia, New 
Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna became French 
citizens under the 1946 Constitution of the French 
Fourth Republic. Many residents of New Caledonia 
are simultaneously New Caledonian citizens under a 
unique arrangement for that territory. 
American Samoa (pop. 55,519 in 2010) has no 
status of its own in international law, but has its own 
constitution and elected legislature, and controls 
immigration and border matters. American Samoa 
has a representative in Washington — currently Eni 
Faleomavaega — the only Samoan in the US Con-
gress. He serves on committees and sponsors legis-
lation but has no voting power. Executive author-
ity is in the hands of the governor. The American 
Samoans are US nationals rather than US citizens. 
Originally, the people of overseas possessions of the 
United States such as Guam, the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico and the US Virgin Islands were also US nation-
als, not US citizens, but the only US nationals today 
are the American Samoans. They are free to carry 
a US passport and to live and work in the United 
States, but are barred from voting or holding office 
in the USA outside American Samoa. 
Guam (pop. 159,358 in 2010) has been a US 
territory since 1898, and has no status of its own in 
international law. The Guamanians elect their own 
governor and legislature, and send a non-voting 
representative to the US Congress. They are US 
citizens and may enter and work in any part of the 
USA. Like American Samoa, it is an ‘unincorporated 
territory’ —meaning that it is not eligible to proceed 
to statehood as, for example, Alaska and Hawai‘i 
were able to do. 
The Northern Mariana Islands (pop. 53,883 in 
2010) passed from Japan to the USA during World 
War II, and benefited from the considerable US 
defence spending that followed. Foreseeing gener-
ous US subsidisation, they opted for a form of US 
territorial status in 1976, and their islands officially 
became a Commonwealth of the USA in 1986. 
According to the US State Department, the term 
‘commonwealth’ ‘broadly describes an area that is 
self-governing under a constitution of its adoption 
and whose right of self-government will not be uni-
laterally withdrawn by Congress’ (US Department of 
State 2013, 2 ). The people of the Northern Maria-
nas became US citizens in 1986 and are free to enter 
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and work in any part of the USA. Their first repre-
sentative in the US Congress was elected in 2008. 
The governor holds executive power and there is a 
bicameral elected legislature. 
Tokelau (pop. 1,411 in 2011), a British pro-
tectorate from 1889, formally passed to New Zea-
land sovereignty in 1948, when its people became 
New Zealand citizens. Tokelau is in many respects 
self-governing. Tokelau is one of five Pacific island 
groups still listed as ‘a non-self-governing territory’ 
by the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, 
and New Zealand reports to the UN each year on 
its administration. (The other four are Ameri-
can Samoa, Guam, New Caledonia, and Pitcairn 
Island.) Tokelau is in many respects self-governing. 
The General Fono (Council), to which authority is 
given by the village councils of the three atolls of 
Atafu, Nukunonu, and Fakaofo, handles national 
issues including shipping, fisheries, and external 
relations — meaning relations with New Zealand 
and with regional organisations such as Te Vaka 
Moana, the Polynesian fisheries grouping. When 
the General Fono is not sitting, authority is exer-
cised by the Council for the Ongoing Government. 
The Tokelau people have voted in two referenda on 
whether to enter free association with New Zea-
land. The referendum question in 2006 and again 
in 2007 was ‘That Tokelau become a self-governing 
State in free association with New Zealand on the 
basis of the Constitution and the Treaty’ but on 
neither occasion did the vote reach the necessary 
two-thirds majority — a requirement imposed by 
the Tokelauans themselves. As a result, Tokelau 
remains a dependent territory of New Zealand. 
Pitcairn Island (pop. 50 in 2013) is a British 
Overseas Territory, originally settled by mutineers of 
the Bounty in 1790. It became a British colony in 1838.
The freely associated states 
The Cook Islands (pop. 10,777 in 2012) and Niue 
(pop. 1,446 in 2011) are freely associated with New 
Zealand. The key importance of free association 
for the Cook Islanders and Niueans is that it 
guarantees them the two benefits they most want 
from the relationship — the right to live and work 
in the metropolitan state, and an assured flow of 
development assistance.
Free association in this case is a unique arrange-
ment between different parts of the same coun-
try, endowing the Cook Islands and Niue with a 
large measure of self-government and autonomous 
capacity but not removing them from a ‘single con-
stitutional entity’ known as the Realm of New Zea-
land (Quentin-Baxter 2008, 614). Everything else 
about free association between New Zealand and 
its associated states flows from this fundamental 
fact, which, above all, determines that the people 
of those states are New Zealand citizens like any 
other. At the same time, the Cook Islands and Niue 
remain distinct Pacific ‘nations’, with their own 
languages, cultural practices and sense of national 
identity. For more than a century, the Cook Islands 
and Niue have been New Zealand sovereign territo-
ry, just as Norfolk Island or the Torres Strait Islands 
are Australian sovereign territory. Britain declared 
a protectorate over the Cook Islands in 1888 in co-
operation with its colony in New Zealand, which, 
with London’s approval, proceeded to annex the 
island group in 1901 as an extension of its terri-
tory in the Pacific (Gilson 1980, 96–109). Demands 
for local government led to the formation in 1947 
of a Legislative Council, which was reorganised as 
a largely elected Legislative Assembly in 1957, and 
in the 1960s Cook Island leaders called for internal 
self-government with the proviso that Cook Island-
ers should keep their New Zealand citizenship 
under any new constitutional arrangement. 
Niue followed a similar historical path. Declared 
a British protectorate in 1900, Niue was annexed by 
New Zealand in 1901 and administered as part of 
New Zealand until 1974. Like the Cook Islanders, 
the Niueans retained their New Zealand citizenship. 
Section 6 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 
and Section 5 of the Niue Constitution Act 1974 
both provide that ‘Nothing in this Act or in the 
Constitution shall affect the status of any person 
as a British subject or New Zealand citizen by 
virtue of the British Nationality and New Zealand 
Citizenship Act 1948’ (New Zealand Government 
194; New Zealand Government 1974). 
The Micronesian islands that now form the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands or RMI (pop. 
54,200 in 2013), the Federated States of Microne-
sia or FSM (pop. 103,000 in 2013) and the Repub-
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lic of Palau (pop. 17,800 in 2013)1 were not under 
American administration until the last years of 
World War II. Germany governed the Marshall 
Islands from 1885 to 1914 and the eastern and 
western Caroline Islands (modern FSM and Palau) 
from 1900 to 1914. When World War I broke out, 
Germany’s Pacific territories north of the equa-
tor fell to Japan, while those south of the equator 
such as Nauru fell to the British Empire. As a con-
sequence, Japan occupied all the former German 
Micronesian territories with the exception of Nauru 
from the end of 1914 and ruled them as a colony 
(from 1920 League of Nations Mandated Territory) 
until it was driven out by the Americans in 1944. 
After World War II, the former Japanese islands 
became part of the UN trusteeship system. Alone 
among the world’s eleven UN trust territories, they 
were a strategic trust, giving the administering 
authority the right to conduct military experiments 
such as nuclear tests. This strategic trusteeship was 
not dissolved by the UN Security Council until 
after the end of the Cold War in 1990.
Free association north of the equator is dif-
ferent from free association south of the equa-
tor. The transition to free association by the Cook 
Islands and Niue was largely uncontentious. The 
move to free association status by the three Micro-
nesian states, by contrast, took place over many 
years and through many rounds of negotiations, 
beginning in 1969. The Compacts of Free Associa-
tion were comprehensive and lengthy legal docu-
ments covering every conceivable aspect of future 
relations between the USA and the Micronesian 
states, and at every point in the negotiations the US 
Department of Defence and the US Congress want-
ed proof that the USA was not surrendering stra-
tegic advantages. After successful plebiscites, the 
Compacts of Free Association with the RMI and 
FSM became law in 1986. They were reviewed after 
the first compact period of 15 years, and amended 
compacts for both countries have operated since 
2004. These will expire in 2023. 
Completing the compact with Palau was 
delayed for more than a decade by its dispute with 
the USA over its 1979 nuclear-free constitution, 
which was unacceptable to the Americans. 
The Palauans participated in nine plebiscites 
between 1983 and 1992 before voting to amend 
their constitution so as to qualify Palau for free 
association status. As a result, Palau did not achieve 
free association until 1994, and its first 15-year 
compact period of funding was from 1995 to 2009. 
In accordance with Section 432 of the compact, 
which requires a re-appraisal after 15, 30 and 40 
years, Palau and the USA conducted a review 
and agreed on an amended compact in 2010. The 
amended Palau compact still awaits action by 
the US Congress in order to pass into law. In the 
meantime, continued funding is reaching Palau in 
the form of annual appropriations. 
Both sides in Micronesia emerged from the 
years of negotiations over free association with 
what they most wanted. The Micronesians obtained 
free access of their citizens to the USA and aid 
guaranteed over lengthy periods. The USA obtained 
guarantees of strategic monopoly and military use 
of a vast area of the northern Pacific:
•  All three Micronesian states conceded strategic 
denial of their islands in perpetuity to any power 
other than the USA. The RMI permitted the 
Americans to continue testing missiles at the 
Kwajalein missile range for an initial period of 30 
years, and Palau guaranteed American military 
use of certain defence sites for 50 years. 
•  The Americans guaranteed aid payments over 
initial periods of 15 years, which could then be 
renegotiated (in 2001 for the RMI and FSM and 
in 2009 for Palau). 
•  The Americans gave the Micronesians a unique, 
but not permanent, immigration status that 
allows them to live and work in the USA.
The key difference between the Pacific’s two 
kinds of free association relates to citizenship. The 
Cook Islanders and Niueans share citizenship with 
other New Zealanders. The people of the RMI, 
FSM and Palau were UN Trust Territory citizens 
from 1947 to 1990, and when the trust ended, they 
became citizens of their own countries with special 
immigration privileges under the compacts. The 
people of the RMI, FSM and Palau are not American 
citizens, and their free entry to the USA, far from 
being a right, is a product of negotiation, contin-
gent upon compact conditions that are subject to 
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change in the future. Far from having to be inferred, 
the terms of the compact relationship with each 
state are spelled out in exhaustive detail in compact 
agreements and revised compact agreements that 
were negotiated over periods of years. The RMI, 
FSM and Palau were seen by negotiating parties on 
both sides as small states entering independence 
under conditions freely entered into — that is, the 
Compacts of Free Association. They conduct their 
own foreign affairs and are members of the UN. 
Termination of free association in both cases 
would depend on mutual agreement — an unstated 
but inevitable requirement in the New Zealand 
case, and spelled out explicitly in the American 
compacts with the three Micronesian freely associ-
ated states. 
Participation by the freely associated states in 
international affairs
The Cook Islands and Niue are states in internation-
al law with the capacity to conduct their own for-
eign relations. Internationally, there are reservations 
about their sovereignty, and as a result they have less 
international capacity than Palau, RMI and FSM. 
The governments of the RMI and FSM ‘have 
the capacity to conduct foreign affairs and shall do 
so in their own name and right, except as otherwise 
provided in this Compact’ and ‘have the capacity to 
enter into, in their own name and right, treaties and 
other international agreements with governments 
and regional and international organizations’ (Com-
pact of Free Association, Section 212(a) and (c)). 
Similar language applies in the Palau compact, and 
it has enabled all three states to become members 
of the UN. As might be expected, the Micronesian 
freely associated states use their foreign policy free-
dom to support the USA. Palau supports the USA 
in the UN more than any other country at 96.5 per 
cent of votes, and the FSM is next, with 94 per cent.  
The RMI’s support is at 81 per cent (Island Times 2011). 
Development Outcomes
The territories
The people of the Pacific territories are more for-
tunate than their counterparts in the independent 
Pacific in a number of ways. They live in territorial 
extensions of advanced states and therefore metro-
politan standards of efficiency in service delivery 
tend to apply. GDP per capita is markedly higher in 
the territories than elsewhere in the region. 
The people of the territories have access to 
labour markets beyond their borders by virtue of 
having metropolitan citizenship. Those of Guam 
and the Northern Marianas are American citizens 
and the American Samoans are American nation-
als. All of them are free to work and live in any part 
of the USA, and many have done so. The economic 
boom in New Caledonia is leading to migration 
between the French territories in the Pacific. French 
Polynesia is an exception among Polynesian coun-
tries in not having a large proportion of its popula-
tion living abroad. A small number move take up 
opportunities offered in New Caledonia, but few 
move to mainland France. New Caledonia is not 
losing population by migration but gaining it as 
people move there from the other two French ter-
Table 3: Membership of international organisations
Country International 
Monetary 
Fund
World 
Bank
Asian 
Development 
Bank 
United 
Nations
Pacific 
Islands 
Forum
Cook Islands No No Yes No Yes
Niue No No No No Yes
Republic of the 
Marshall Islands
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Federated States of 
Micronesia
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Palau Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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ritories, especially from Wallis and Futuna, more 
than half of whose people live outside their home 
islands (Hayes 2010). The World Bank Database 
shows that over the 2007–11 period, net annual 
emigration from French Polynesia was around 400, 
while net annual immigration into New Caledonia 
was over 6,000.
The French territories spend far more per 
capita on health care than do the freely associated 
states. In New Caledonia in 2008 it was $US3,399, 
and a similar figure applies in French Polynesia. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports 
a ‘well-functioning mother and child health pro-
gramme’ in New Caledonia with high rates of vac-
cination coverage, including for Hepatitis B. As 
in other Pacific countries, there are periodic out-
breaks of dengue fever, with about 40,000 people 
infected in 2009, but the major disease burden 
resembles that of an advanced Western country — 
cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and kidney disease. 
The WHO’s assessment of French Polynesia is that 
it has reached ‘a high level of health and socioeco-
nomic development’ with a rise in non-communi-
cable diseases and a fall in the incidence of com-
municable ones. Almost the entire population has 
access to quality health care, while infant mortality 
and maternal mortality rates are low. As in Western 
countries, heart disease and cancer are the major 
causes of death in French Polynesia (WHO 2011a). 
The size of the French territorial budgets has 
more in common with those of advanced indus-
trialised countries than with those of its Pacific 
neighbours. New Caledonia’s 2012 budget pro-
vided for expenditure of XPF188 billion (Pacific 
French francs) or AUD$1.9 billion for a population 
of about 256,000. This amounted to AUD$7,515 
per capita — a level of government expenditure far 
above that of any independent Pacific island coun-
try and somewhat greater than for the New Zealand 
freely associated states. The Cook Islands budget 
provided for expenditure of NZ$112,690,000 in the 
2012–13 budget or AUD$86,771,300, which was 
about AUD$5,784 per capita (Cook Islands 2011, 
29). In addition to the territorial budgets, there is 
considerable expenditure on public servants who are 
employed by government departments in France. 
Not until 2012, for example, were secondary school 
teachers paid from the New Caledonia budget rather 
than from the budget of the French Republic itself. 
Total government revenue, including public 
transfers (primarily from France) is equivalent to 
some 40 per cent of GDP in New Caledonia and 
around 45 per cent in French Polynesia. In both 
cases, grants comprise some 64 per cent of total 
government revenue (Lagadec and Ris 2010; Poirine 
2010). In other words, the French territories are 
massively subsidised from Paris, and on a scale that 
dwarfs development assistance to the independent 
Pacific. If the level of French subsidies to its Pacific 
territories were to be replicated for Solomon Islands, 
which has a similar population of around 550,000, 
development assistance there would multiply 13 
times, from less than AUD$300 million a year to 
AUD$4 billion. 
The freely associated states 
Development outcomes in the five freely associated 
states are more diverse than in the territories. The 
three with the smallest populations — the Cook 
Islands, Niue, and Palau — have standards of living 
that compare favourably with the developed world, 
but development in the other two — RMI and FSM 
— is more like that in the independent Pacific. 
The Cook Islands and Niue receive official 
development assistance, which comes from a vari-
ety of donor states and international organisations. 
About a third of the Cook Islands’ aid comes from 
non-New Zealand sources. The harmonised aid 
program funded by New Zealand and Australia is 
the country’s largest source of assistance but it also 
receives multilateral aid through membership of the 
Pacific Islands Forum, and from the Asian Devel-
Table 4: Estimates of GDP per capita in the 
American and French territories, 20132
Territory GDP per capita (US$)
Guam 28,232
Northern Marianas 13,288
American Samoa 12,662
New Caledonia 38,973
French Polynesia 24,669
Wallis and Futuna 13,220
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opment Bank, as well as UN agencies, Japan, and 
the European Union. A similar pattern of aid flows 
applies to Niue. The consequence is to relieve New 
Zealand of the full cost of aid to these freely associ-
ated states. US funding under the Compacts of Free 
Association financially underpins the Micronesian 
freely associated states, which also receive aid from 
elsewhere, including Australia. US federal funding 
accounts for 14 per cent of GDP in Palau, 41 per 
cent in RMI and 55 per cent in FSM (O’Connor 
and Casey 2011, ES-2).
Like the people of the territories, those of 
the freely associated states have access to labour 
markets beyond their borders, and the right to 
migrate to certain metropolitan states. About 
56,000 ‘compact’ migrants from the RMI, FSM, 
and Palau were living in the USA by 2011 — 
about a quarter of the total population of the 
Micronesian freely associated states. Of these, 
about 30,000 were living in Guam and Hawai‘i. 
The Cook Islanders and Niueans, as New Zealand 
citizens, can migrate to Australia as well as New 
Zealand. About 63,000  Cook Islanders were living 
in Australia and New Zealand in 2006, and 15,000 
in the Cook Islands. The equivalent figures for 
Niueans were 23,000 and 1,600. 
The US Census of 2010 showed an estimated 
22,400 Marshallese to be living in the USA. Nine 
mainland US states had compact migrant popula-
tions of more than 1,000 in 2011 (GAO 2011a). 
One of them is Arkansas, which has attracted a 
large number of Marshallese to work in the chicken 
industry. There were 4,324 Marshallese living in the 
state in 2010, and another 4,000 are estimated to 
live in Costa Mesa, California (Riklon et al. 2010). 
RMI maintains a consulate in Springdale, Arkansas, 
and runs a Citizens Orientation Program there for 
newly arrived Marshallese migrants in order to ‘ease 
and lessen the burden of culture shock to our citi-
zens, but more importantly, to enable our citizens to 
assimilate into their new homes in the United States 
as contributing members of that society’. (Zedkaia 
2010). As in the Cook Islands and Niue, the con-
tinuing migration of Micronesians to the USA is 
seen by some, probably a minority, as undermining 
development at home in the islands. Palau, the most 
successful of the compact economies, loses people 
to the USA, but also has more than 6,000 foreign 
workers in a total population of about 21,000. 
The three best-performing freely associated 
states have health outcomes and life expectancy 
that are superior to those of the independent 
Pacific. Cook Islanders, for example, have a life 
expectancy of 80 years. The Cook Islands has an 
impressive health record. The maternal mortality 
rate is low, and was zero in the decade 1996–2005. 
The immunisation rate is 100 per cent. Under the 
Cook Islands Health Specialist Visits Programme, 
the Ministry of Health funds medical specialists 
from Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere to 
provide services not available in the public hospi-
tals in Rarotonga and Aitutaki or the clinics health 
centres on the outer islands (NZAID 2011). Niue 
has good health outcomes. The WHO reports that 
‘in general, health indicators for Niue are good’ 
with communicable diseases largely contained, 100 
per cent vaccination coverage and good maternal 
and child health care (WHO 2011b). Palau has 
made progress in improving the health of its citi-
zens. According to a 2012 report on MDGs, Palau 
devotes ‘by far the highest proportion’ of its health 
expenditure to preventive and public health of any 
country in the Asia Pacific region (UNESCAP, 
ADB & UNDP 2011, 60). The WHO reports great 
progress in improving maternal health in Palau.
The health situation in the worst-performing 
freely associated states — RMI and FSM — is less 
positive. ‘Health indicators vary across Micronesia’, 
according to a 2010 Hawai‘i study that focused on 
the RMI and FSM, 
but in general are quite poor with high rates 
of chronic and infectious disease. Infant mor-
Table 5: Estimates of GDP per capita in the  
    freely associated states, 20133
Freely Associated State GDP per capita US$
Cook Islands 15,447
Palau 11,164
Niue 10,358
RMI 3,910
FSM 2,205
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tality and life expectancy are poor when com-
pared to US standards. Tuberculosis, Hepati-
tis B, and Syphilis are endemic in Micronesia. 
Outbreaks of Cholera and Dengue fever are 
not uncommon. Hansen’s disease [leprosy] is 
still commonly diagnosed. Malnutrition and 
Vitamin A deficiency remain serious prob-
lems in many of the outlying areas … Obesity 
is a significant problem affecting half of all 
men and women. Type 2 Diabetes rates are 
alarming affecting half of the people over 50 
years of age (Riklon et al. 2010, 7). 
On the other hand, the people of the RMI and 
the FSM can freely enter the USA and seek better 
health there, and many do. More than a hundred 
FAS Micronesians are on dialysis in Hawai‘i, for 
example, and 130–160 are receiving chemotherapy. 
Sick people in the RMI and FSM have options that 
sick people in independent Pacific countries do not 
usually have. 
Standards of service delivery differ from coun-
try to country. The Cook Islands, Palau and Niue do 
very well; the RMI and the FSM, especially the FSM, 
do worse but still better than, say, Papua New Guinea 
or Solomon Islands. For example, the Cook Islands, 
Palau and Niue show 95 per cent or more of births 
attended by skilled medical personnel and the figure 
is between 85 per cent and 90 per cent in the FSM. 
This compares with a minority of births in PNG.
Explaining Development Outcomes
The territories are all characterised by economic 
and administrative integration — in varying 
degrees — with advanced states. This integration 
gives the Pacific territories a flow of resources and 
a strong administrative capacity which does much 
to explain their comparative well-being. The best 
outcomes in the Pacific Islands for the MDGs, 
health, education, standard of living, financial 
accountability and human security are in the 
American and French territories. Large subsidies, 
coupled with the authority and standard-setting 
capacity of national governments in Washington 
and Paris, ensure that political instability in 
the territories, if it occurs, has little impact on 
government administration that is highly efficient 
by Pacific standards. 
What about the freely associated states? They 
too are characterised by levels of economic and 
administrative integration not found in the inde-
pendent Pacific. The US government, for exam-
ple, provides all three Micronesian states with 
‘compact-authorised’ services whereby the relevant 
US government agency extends its services to the 
Micronesian states. There are compact-author-
ised services for weather, aviation, and the post. 
The US Postal Service, for example, conveys mail 
between the US and the freely associated states; 
the Federal Aviation Administration provides en-
route air traffic control from the US, together with 
technical assistance; and the National Weather 
Service reimburses the Micronesian states for con-
ducting weather observations. US Federal Discre-
tionary Programs substantially augment compact 
funding (GAO 2006, 58). Discretionary funding 
amounted to about a third of all US funding of 
Palau 1995–2009, and is expected to account for 
half of it during the second compact period to 
2024 (GAO 2011b, 17.) 
The amended compacts, which provide for 
funding of US$3.5 billion to the RMI and FSM 
from 2004 to 2023, involve considerable US gov-
ernment supervision of fiscal transfers and island 
budgets. US government agencies closely moni-
tor and oversee the spending of compact funds 
in the freely associated states. A fiscal procedures 
agreement is meant to ensure that accountability 
and conditions in compact spending match those 
that apply to US federal grants to the states. An 
office for monitoring compact assistance, based in 
Honolulu, tracks compact spending in the islands, 
and joint economic management committees 
consisting of high level officials from both sides, 
make decisions about compact spending, These 
are known as JEMCO (Joint Economic Manage-
ment Committee) in the FSM and JEMFAC (Joint 
Economic Management and Fiscal Accountability 
Committee) in the RMI.
On the other hand, US policy towards the 
freely associated states is to remove the financial 
burden they place on the US government and 
create self-sustaining island economies. Com-
pact funding is specifically designed to remove 
the dependence of the freely associated states on 
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US assistance. The amended compacts for RMI 
and FSM include a mechanism by which annual 
decreases in US grant funding are paired with 
equivalent increases in US contributions to trust 
funds: ‘The decrement in grant funding is depos-
ited into the FSM’s and the RMI’s trust funds. 
The RMI’s annual decrement of $500,000 began 
in 2004, and the FSM’s annual decrement of 
US$800,000 began in 2007.’ (GAO 2006, 4). The 
American intention is to end compact funding for 
RMI and FSM by 2023, and for Palau by 2024 in 
the expectation that trust funds and locally gener-
ated revenue will pay for the island governments 
after that. As the American Ambassador to RMI, 
Martha L. Campbell, said in speech at the Col-
lege of the Marshall Islands in 2010: ‘I can say with 
all certainty at this point in time that there is no 
intention on the part of anyone anywhere in gov-
ernment of the U.S. to extend Compact funding 
past 2023’ (Campbell 2010). 
For the Cook Islands and Niue, free association 
‘involves a commitment by the New Zealand 
Government to continue its financial support of 
the associated State’ (Quentin-Baxter 2008, 615), 
and since 1974 this support has been channelled 
through the aid budget. Some official observers 
refer to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau as 
the ‘Realm responsibilities’. Those who devised 
free association saw it as an arrangement reached 
between different groups of New Zealanders, and 
one that might evolve over time in the same way 
that New Zealand’s relationship with the UK had 
evolved earlier, with increasing autonomy for the 
Cook Islanders.
After the territories, the Cook Islands and 
Palau emerge as the most successful economies in 
the Pacific, due for the most part to their tourism 
industries. The Cook Islands records a surplus on 
current account — $NZ85 million in 2010, despite 
a trade deficit of $NZ105 million — and Palau 
has imported thousands of workers (Neves 2012). 
The RMI and FSM have few sources of income 
from abroad apart from aid and fisheries licences. 
According to expert testimony to Congress in 
2008, ‘The FSM’s budget is characterized by 
limited tax revenue and a growing wage bill, and 
the two private sector industries identified as 
having growth potential — fisheries and tourism 
— face significant barriers to expansion because of 
the FSM’s remote geographic location, inadequate 
infrastructure and poor business environment’ 
(GAO 2008, 2). A similar pattern applies to RMI. 
The highest net migration rate from any of these 
countries and territories is recorded in the poorest 
one — the FSM — where it was -21 per thousand 
in 2010. Palau, by contrast, had a positive net 
migration rate of 0.86 per thousand, and the RMI 
-5.3 per thousand. In other words, people leave to 
find a better life but stay if development is taking 
place, or else, as is happening in Palau, they leave 
but are replaced by others in a successful economy. 
Findings
First, subsidisation of one kind or another charac-
terises all Pacific Island economies, whether territo-
rial, freely associated, or independent. Indeed the 
most striking feature of modern political economies 
in the region is the unevenness of that subsidisation 
— massive in the territories and smallest,  despite 
the aid dependency of the Pacific, in the independ-
ent Pacific countries. 
Second, the high degree of economic and admin-
istrative integration found in Pacific territories guar-
antees development and brings them into the ranks 
of the advanced world, even though stark inequali-
ties, political divisions, and hopes for independence 
remain in some territories, such as New Caledonia. 
Third, the lesser degree of economic and admin-
istrative integration of the kind found in the freely 
associated states does not guarantee development, 
but may play a part in delivering it where conditions 
favour investment, such as the Cook Islands and 
Palau. Free association, when combined with tour-
ism and economic growth (Cook Islands, Palau), 
or massive subvention (Niue) produces a highly 
favourable effect on improving people’s standards of 
living and opportunities as measured by the MDGs. 
Fourth, free association combined with little 
economic growth, as in RMI and FSM, merely 
averts the worst MDG outcomes. Yet if we make 
individuals and families, rather than states, the 
‘subject’ of development, free association, even 
in FSM and RMI, offers people the opportunity 
to do better for themselves somewhere else. The 
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number who have done so suggests that, measured 
in terms of individual life chances rather than 
national economic statistics, it has development 
potential. A 2012 survey of Marshallese living in 
Springdale, Arkansas, found half were satisfied 
with their employment prospects even in the 
midst of a recession, and that 63 per cent had 
health insurance compared with 38 per cent for 
an equivalent population of Latino migrants. 
Some said they had moved to Arkansas because 
it offered educational opportunities. While the 
Marshallese of Springdale face many challenges, 
their children will enjoy opportunities in education 
and employment that they would not have had at 
home in the Pacific (Jimeno and Rafael 2013). Free 
association has made those opportunities possible. 
Conclusion
Development assistance to independent Pacific 
states is here to stay. Donors such as Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, and the USA will continue to 
see aid as contributing to regional stability. China 
has graduated from minor to major donor: at the 
2013 China–Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum in 
Guangzhou, Vice Premier Wang Yang offered  
US$1 billion in concessional loans for infra-
structure development to Pacific countries that 
recognise the People’s Republic — Fiji, Cook 
Islands, Micronesia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, and Vanuatu (RNZI 2013). And with the 
coming of new players such as the United Arab 
Emirates and Russia, more donors are offering 
assistance to the Pacific than ever before. In any 
case, the idea that small island states can rapidly 
progress to rapid economic growth simply by 
adopting free market policies seems discredited, 
even if particular initiatives work, such as opening 
up mobile phone markets.4 As Francis Hezel has 
pointed out, ‘It may be misleading to think ... of 
Pacific Island nations as possessing small economic 
engines that with proper overhaul or fine-tuning, 
can deliver maximum performance and carry 
each nation where it needs to go’. Development 
assistance might well be ‘a long term fixture’ of 
the relationship between advanced countries and 
Pacific states (Hezel 2012, 27).
Under these conditions, what lessons might we 
draw from the disparities of Pacific development 
for the effective use of aid? What are the policy 
implications for major donors such as Australia? 
The implications are of two types: the first 
apply to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa, and 
Tonga, as well as Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, 
and concern access to Australia’s labour market. 
In most respects, Papua New Guinea cannot 
be compared with Pacific territories and freely 
associated states. Papua New Guinea has the largest 
population in the Pacific by far (7.4 million), 
the highest economic growth rate, the lowest 
development performance, and the greatest inflow 
of development assistance in absolute terms. But 
Papua New Guinea would nevertheless benefit 
from a sizeable expansion of Australia’s seasonal 
labour scheme, and from new and different forms 
of labour mobility to Australia. 
The same applies to Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga — 
the most successful countries of the independent 
Pacific Islands region. The foundations of effective 
states and bureaucracies there were stronger at 
independence than elsewhere in the region, and 
notably stronger than in western Melanesia, and 
the years since independence have done little 
to change that difference. On the UN Human 
Development Index for 2013, Fiji, Tonga, and 
Samoa rank almost together as countries with 
what the UN calls ‘medium human development’. 
Through temporary and permanent migration, 
these countries have benefited from years of access 
to the labour markets of the advanced world in 
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere. 
Here again, Australia could nevertheless do more 
to encourage labour mobility. 
Solomon Islands is at present emerging from 
a decade of development intervention under the 
Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI), and is 
making the transition to conventional, bilateral 
relationships with donors. RAMSI itself remains 
in diminished form as a mission to strengthen 
the Solomon Islands police force. Under RAMSI, 
Solomon Islands has experienced the enhanced 
flows of aid and administrative expertise that 
characterise Pacific territories and freely associated 
states, while, for the most part, lacking a key 
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element of their relationship with the outside 
world — access to overseas labour markets and 
remittance flows. Here too, and in Vanuatu, which 
is benefiting considerably from its labour access to 
New Zealand, Australia should consider increased 
access to its labour market as a non-aid way of 
assisting development. 
The second kind type of implication for 
Australia’s policy applies to relations with the 
smallest independent island states in Micronesia 
and Polynesia — Nauru, Kiribati, and Tuvalu 
(combined population about 120,000). The 
American free association model preserves the 
sovereignty of Palau, the RMI, and FSM by basing 
the relationship on treaties freely entered into 
between sovereign states. The Micronesian states 
have no constitutional relationship to the USA 
and are members in their own right of the UN. 
This kind of ‘sovereign free association’ suggests 
a way forward for Australia’s relations with the 
smallest island states. Australia could enter into 
relationships that resembled free association with 
these countries on the basis of bilateral treaties 
without compromising their sovereign status or 
capacity to participate in the international system 
and without affecting their eligibility to obtain 
ODA from other sources. 
The distinguishing characteristics of any such 
relationship between Australia and Pacific states, 
whatever it was called, would be some degree of 
labour mobility allowing Islanders access to the 
Australian labour market, guarantees of long-
term development assistance, and enhanced 
administrative integration of the kind that has 
already taken place in Solomon Islands and 
Nauru, with Australia working with Island states 
to supply certain treaty-authorised services of 
the kind the USA performs in Micronesia. When 
Pacific Islanders can earn money for themselves 
in Australia or New Zealand, island economies 
grow and the need for aid diminishes. When island 
bureaucracies work better, instability is less likely 
and regional security more assured. From the 
island point of view, being able to work in Australia 
is highly attractive. And with the prospect of rising 
sea levels rendering atoll states such as Kiribati and 
Tuvalu less and less habitable in future decades, 
Australia will eventually need a policy answer to 
an emerging problem of climate refugees in its own 
neighbourhood. 
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